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Curcuru, Thomas, and Dvorak's paper provides an in‐depth discussion
of the problems with the official data that depicts one of the greatest
mysteries of modern macroeconomics, namely, that the net interna-
tional investment position (IIP) of the United States does not seem to
be deteriorating significantly, although the country is running very large
current account deficits.
The paper also argues convincingly that one can discriminate among
various “theories” or rather “stories” about the mystery based on a
careful evaluation of the relative reliability of data on various subcom-
ponents of the international accounts (the stocks [IIP], the flows of asset
accumulation, and the returns).
The authors’ analysis suggests that the dark matter story fails since it
is built on the assumption that the data on investment income are the
most reliable and accurate item in the balance of payments, whereas in
reality investment income is largely estimated.
The paper describes in considerable detail the authors’ views on how
the official U.S. statistics concerning the current account and the U.S. IIP
should be adjusted to reflect reality.
The paper concludes that after plugging various holes in the ac-
counts, the authors find that the positive returns differential the United
States earns on its net IIP is much smaller than implied by the exorbi-
tant privilege theory. They thus take a more open stance on this later
view, which implies that the United States can run much larger current
account deficits because it receives a higher return on its investments
abroad than it pays on its investment liabilities. The authors do not em-
phasize this, but the “exorbitant privilege view” is similar to the “dark
matter view” in that both have at their basis a high return differential.
The difference between these two views lies essentially in the way the
income investment data are reconciled with the data on the stocks of
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value of the stock of (net) assets (which, since they do not show up in
the statistics, are called “dark matter”). In the exorbitant privilege view,
the asset data are mixed with the income return data using heroic as-
sumptions about the nature of large statistical discrepancies in order to
calculate “overall return” (essentially the sum of reported returns plus
any changes in asset values).
Curcuru et al. undertake a massive effort to create more reliable data
in order to be able to arrive at more accurate estimates of rates of re-
turns on U.S. foreign assets and liabilities. However, as their conclusion,
mentioned above, shows, they can only partially reduce the mystery
and thus hold their ultimate judgment. The one firm point taken in
the paper is, however, that the revised position data presented here
are the most reliable statistics.
One first comment is that the authors start, naturally, with the latest
available crop of data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
This is unavoidable but risky since these data will be subject to impor-
tant revisions. Any attempt to produce better estimates of investment
income and to reconcile the data on IIP and transactions is thus like the
labor of Sisyphus: it is bound to yield only temporary results since the
baseline is shifting continuously.
A first important revision has already become available since the
authors finished their paper. In the latest release of the BEA (as of June
17, 2008),
1 the net U.S. IIP as of the end of 2006 is put at US$2.225 billion,
about $370 billion less than assumed in the paper (see their table 2). A
difference of $370 billion in the net U.S. IIP is certainly not minor. To
put this number into perspective, one might note that that the authors
statethatwiththeiradjustmentstheyarriveatacumulatedstatisticaldis-
crepancy that ranges from $276 billion to $555 billion. The 2008 revision
to the end of 2006 U.S. IIP alone could thus strongly affect the conclu-
sions. But the key point here is that the 2008 revision is unlikely to be
the last one.
2
Even data further in the past is subject to frequent revisions, as table 1
shows. This table concentrates, as an example, on just one item of the
U.S. IIP, namely, direct investment (DI) for 2002 and 2003 as it was re-
ported by the International Monetary Fund in its balance of payments
database on CD‐ROM. The table reports the data found on the January
2005 and the May 2008 editions of this series of CD‐ROMs. It is appar-
ent that the data were substantially revised between 2005 and 2008. If
Curcuru et al. had done their analysis in 2005 (using the data available
as of January 2005), they would have assumed that U.S. DI abroad was
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the 2008 vintage of data, they would have to assume that U.S. DI
abroad was much smaller, only $2.054 billion. Even if the investment
income data were not revised, this revision in the stock data alone
would have necessitated large revisions in the estimated rates of return.
Data revisions are a fact of life for empirical research, but in the case
of the U.S. international accounts, they are not only an order of magni-
tude larger than for other macroeconomic variables, they also continue
for a long time and have a systematic tendency (bias?). Many revisions
to the U.S. IIP data find that foreign assets in the United States are
smaller than previously estimated and vice versa for U.S. assets abroad,
which are usually subsequently found to be larger than previously es-
timated (DI represents an exception to this). There is a simple reason for
this tendency. As the BEA casts its net ever wider in the search for in-
stitutions that might hold assets abroad, it is only natural that it tends
to find over time more and more U.S. assets abroad. At the same time
as foreigners continuously shuffle around their holding of U.S. assets, it
is likely that in this process the U.S. authorities (and the global custo-
dians on whose data the BEA relies) lose track of the foreign ownership
of some assets. Moreover, there are entire asset classes, for example,
shares in hedge funds registered in tax havens, for which it is close to
impossible to establish the ultimate “beneficial ownership.” The hedge
fund itself might be registered in the Bahamas. Its holdings of U.S. as-
sets would be classified as foreign owned, but in reality most of the
owners of the hedge fund (formally often a partnership) might be U.S.
citizens whose holdings of a partnership share in the hedge fund would
not be registered by the usual surveys.
Curcuru et al. do not discuss this bias in revisions and concentrate
instead exclusively on adjusting the (for them, current vintage of the)
U.S. IIP and income data. In their adjustments they emphasize some
aspects (e.g., underrecording of exports) that seem much less plausible
if one does not look only at the United States. A good example is the
Table 1
Comparison of Different Vintages of U.S. IIP Data
Old (2005 Vintage) New (2008 Vintage)
2002 2003 2002 2003
DI abroad 2,039.78 2,730.29 1,867.04 2,054.46
DI in reporting economy 2,025.35 2,435.54 1,499.95 1,580.99
Source: International Monetary Fund, CD‐ROMs, “Balance of Payments.”“ Old” means
data from the May 2005 CD‐ROM; “new” means data from the May 2008 CD‐ROM.
Comment 115argument that exports are underreported relative to imports because
imports are subject to tariffs. However, this argument should cut both
ways: with ad valorem imports as the rule, one would expect that trad-
ers have an incentive to report lower values for imports (but could be
relaxed about declaring exports). The authors motivate their discussion
by examples from mirror statistics, that is, the imports from the United
States declared by its partner countries. However, the specific examples
given (Canada) do not seem to justify a general rule. A check by the
author on German data found that German exports to the United States
(as reported by German statistical authorities) are identical (to 99%) to
the imports as reported by the U.S. authorities.
Another way to check the argument that there might be systematic
underreporting of exports is to look at the global discrepancy between
reported exports and imports (which at the level of the world economy
should be equal). Figure 1 shows that while in the past it might have
sometimes been true that imports were overreported, this is no longer
the case, at least on average across all countries. In 2007 the reported
difference between exports (of goods and services) and imports was
over $200 billion, or around 1.3% of total reported exports. It is difficult
to see why the United States should be subject to the opposite phenom-
enon (as argued by Curcuru et al.). Hence, it is difficult to accept the
large revisions to U.S. exports imposed on the data by the authors.
A similar comment applies to the current account. Until about 2004/5
the global current account balance was usually negative and there was a
largedifferencebetweenthediscrepancyontrade(ingoodsandservices)
Fig. 1. World trade and current account (im)balances
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2005/6, unilateral transfers and payments on foreign liabilities were
overreported (at least relative to the reporting of receipts of transfers
and receipts on foreign income). Over time the difference between the
reported global “balance” on the current account and goodsand services
has narrowed considerably, suggesting that the measurement of income
receipts must have improved.
It is difficult to argue with the many other detailed revisions to the
stock and return data that Curcuru et al. propose. What is really sur-
prising is, however, that there is no in‐depth discussion of DI return
data. The authors seem to assume that DI data are more reliable than
other data because DI data are collected at the firm level, not estimated.
However, there are a number of indications that both the stock and the
return data for DI contain a large bias.
The one key element in the (reported) difference between the rates of
returns on U.S. assets and liabilities is the item “reinvested earnings.” It
is somewhat surprising that the authors do not comment on this key
item in their section of estimated return differentials given that the pos-
itive U.S. income account results essentially from the data reported for
reinvested (or retained) earnings. Both the dark matter and the exorbi-
tant privilege views are primarily the result of a gaping asymmetry in
this item: Although all sources suggest that foreign DI in the United
States is of an order of magnitude similar to that of U.S. DI abroad,
the U.S. income accounts contain almost three times as much in DI in-
come receipts ($370 billion) as in DI income payments ($130 billion,
both 2007 data). This discrepancy should have been mentioned and
its reliability should have been evaluated carefully. Doubts about the
reliability of the reported DI income data would have provided addi-
tional support for the authors’ conclusion that the measured return differ-
ential is not so large as to eliminate all concerns about the sustainability
o ft h eU . S .e x t e r n a lp o s i t i o n .
A paper on the relative reliability of international accounts would
have benefited from some cross‐country evidence. The data for the euro
zone are especially interesting in this context. It is not widely appre-
ciated that the net IIP position of the euro zone is of an order of mag-
nitude similar to that of the United States. The European Central Bank
reports that as of the end of 2007, the euro zone had a net debtor posi-
tion of €1.330 billion, equivalent to over $2.000 billion (by comparison
the U.S. net IIP, as reported by the BEA for the end of 2007, amounts to
about $2.400 billion). As table 2 shows, the net IIP of the euro area has
deteriorated by about $1.500 billion during the last 8 years for which
Comment 117data are available,although its current account has been roughly in equi-
librium over this period. The euro area thus shows a “gap” more than
60% of that of the United States (and of an order of magnitude similar
to the one shown in Curcuru et al.’s fig. 3), but with the opposite sign.
Fortheeurozonethephenomenontobeexplainedisthustheopposite
of that for the United States: How could the euro zone become such a
large debtor without ever running significant current account deficits?
PanelAoftable2showsthatotherlargeeconomiesalsoshowlargegaps.
It seems that the correlation between the current account and changes in
net asset positions is rather weak in general, and not just for the United
States.
However, in another sense the euro zone is similar to the United
States since the euro zone also benefits from a small “exorbitant privi-
lege”becauseitsinvestmentincomeaccountisbalanceddespitethehuge
netdebtorposition.Thisispossiblebecausetherecordedrateofreturnon
the foreignassetsofthe eurozoneis3.9%,somewhathigherthan therate
ofreturnpaidonitsforeignliabilities(3.6%).Thisdifferentialisnotmuch
Table 2
Cross‐Country Evidence of the Relative Reliability of International Accounts (Billions
of U.S. Dollars)
A. Consistency between Flows (Current Account) and Stocks (IIP): Cumulated Current









(Col. 1 − Col. 2)




Japan 1.079 655 424
United Kingdom −321 −405 84
United States −4.292 −1.644 −2.648
Russia 409 −59 350





Euro area −847.0 10.5 4.4% −4.1%
Japan 1,808.2 118.2 3.9% −1.7%
United Kingdom −599.0 34.9 5.3% −4.7%
United States −2,539.6 43.2 5.6% −4.4%
Russia −63.2 −25.2 5.6% −9.7%
Source: Own calculations on International Financial Statistics balance of payments data.
*Until the end of 2007.
Gros 118differentfromthelowerendoftherangeestimatedbytheauthorsforthe
United States. Moreover, as panel B of table 2 shows, other large OECD
economies(suchastheUnitedKingdomandJapan)alsoseemtoenjoyan
exorbitantprivilege.ThedataforRussiashowtheoppositephenomenon
(rates of return on liabilities much larger than on assets), suggesting that
emerging markets might provide the counterpart to the exorbitant priv-
ilege apparently enjoyed by most OECD economies, and not just the
United States.
Endnotes




2008, which states that “As is customary each June, estimates of U.S. international transac-
tions are updated and revised to incorporate newly available source data and improved es-
timating methodologies” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/
transnewsrelease.htm).
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